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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BETTY J. NELSON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
PEKEY A. PETERSON, M.D., and 
VALLEY WEST HOSPITAL DE-
VELOPMENT CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation, dba VALLEY 
WEST HOSPITAL, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
PERKY A. PETERSON, M.D. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a medical malpractice action alleging dam-
ages for pain and mental suffering of the appellant as 
a result of a stillbirth. 
DISPOiSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
A jury returned a unanimous verdict of no cause 
of action against the appellant and in favor of both re-
spondents. 
Case No. 
13803 
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BELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's Statement of Facts violates the rule 
that the evidence should be viewed "in the light most 
favorable" to the parties who won the verdict of the 
jury. Rivets v. Pacific Finance Co., 16 Utah 2d 183, 397 
P.2d 990 (1964); Paull v. Zions First National Bank, 
18 Utah 2d 183, 417 P.2d 759 (1966). The facts will 
therefore be restated and the parties will be designated 
by name or as they appeared in the trial court. 
The plaintiff engaged the services of Dr. Peterson 
in January, 1971, soon after she became pregnant and 
continued under his care throughout the term of her 
pregnancy. (R. 334.) The plaintiff was then 42 and 
had previously given birth to seven children. (R. 333, 
357.) On September 2, 1971, the plaintiff went to Dr. 
Peterson's office for a routine examination. Dr. Peter-
son examined her shortly before 4:00 p.m. and, although 
she was not having contractions, he observed that the 
cervix was thinned out and was beginning to dilate in-
dicating that labor might be imminent. (R. 251.) At the 
time of the examination, the doctor also observed that 
the membranes were bulging, but the bag of waters 
had not ruptured. (R. 274.) Since the plaintiff was 
several days overdue, the doctor elected to send her to 
the hospital to induce labor that evening. (R. 247, 274.) 
Dr. Peterson advised the plaintiff to go directly to the 
hospital, but agreed that she could stop by her home 
2 
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since she had asked to do so. (E. 274, 339.) The doctor 
then notified the hospital that she was to be admitted 
for labor induction and informed the nurse that the 
plaintiff's membranes were bulging, but had not rup-
tured. (E. 274.) 
The plaintiff arrived at the hospital at approxi-
mately 4:40 p.m. where she was promptly admitted and 
put to bed. (E. 339, 326.) She informed the supervis-
ing nurse that she had not felt any contractions or pain 
and did not express any complaints to the hospital staff. 
(E. 356-357, 328.) In accordance with Dr. Peterson's 
standard admission orders, the nurses administered an 
enema and recorded the fetal heart tones. (E. 265, 326.) 
Thereafter, the plaintiff remained in her room until 
approximately 6:30 p.m., during which time she did 
not experience any pain or contractions. (E. 356-357.) 
During this period, the nurses were assisting in a com-
plicated delivery, but were available if plaintiff had 
needed help. There was a call button at her bedside 
and her sister was with her but neither called for as-
sistance. (E. 407, 357.) 
At approximately 6:30 p.m., the nurses delivered 
drug infusion equipment to the plaintiff's room and 
began preparations for administration of labor-inducing 
medication. (E. 409.) The nurses had some difficulty 
regulating the infusion pump, but no medication was 
delivered until the machine was operating properly. 
(E. 412-413.) Two or three minutes later, Dr. Peter-
son arrived at the plaintiff's room and, after adjust-
3 
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ing the infusion pump to deliver the medication to the 
plaintiff, he immediately examined her just as she was 
experiencing her first contraction. (R. 413, 259-260.) 
Dr. Peterson's internal examination revealed that 
the umbilical cord was looped and was protruding into 
the plaintiff's vagina. (E. 260.) The doctor immediately 
pushed the baby's head upward in the birth canal and 
held it there to release pressure from the cord to allow 
resumption of circulation and administered oxygen to 
the plaintiff. (R. 262.) Despite these resuscitation ef-
forts, which continued for 10 to 15 minutes, no resump-
tion of fetal life was detected. (R. 263.) The labor in-
duction was then resumed and the stillborn child was 
delivered approximately two hours later. (R. 263-264.) 
Dr. John W. Harris, a qualified Salt Lake City 
obstetrician was produced by plaintiff as an expert 
witness and he testified that in the Salt Lake City hos-
pitals with which he was familiar, when a maternity 
patient was admitted to the hospital, the standard prac-
tice required an abdominal and vaginal examination of 
the patient and the nurses should inquire if the pa-
tient's water had broken and they should listen to, and 
record, the fetal heart tones. He further testified on 
direct examination that a vaginal examination should 
"be done by some personnel" if induction of labor was 
to be commenced by the use of an infusion machine. 
(R. 295, 297, 300, 318.) On cross-examination, Dr. 
Harris conceded that the requirement of an abdominal 
examination would be met by either finger palpitation 
or by listening with a stethoscope (R. 306) and if the 
4 
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membranes had not ruptured, there would be no need 
for a vaginal examination where, as in the present case, 
the patient came to the hospital immediately after a 
vaginal examination by the doctor in his office. (R. 308.) 
A vaginal examination by the nurse might, or might not, 
determine if the membranes had ruptured because this 
is often a difficult determination, even for an obstetri-
cian. (R. 309.) 
Dr. Harris further admitted on cross-examination 
that the requirement of a vaginal examination before 
the machine induction of labor began would be satisfied 
if the doctor performed such an examination at about 
the time the machine was started (R. 311, 312) and the 
evidence is undisputed that Dr. Peterson performed 
such an examination at that time. The nurses had had 
difficulty in getting the machine to operate and when 
Dr. Peterson arrived, the patient was not getting any 
medication and he turned the "stop cock" to direct the 
flow of medication into the patient. He then made a 
vaginal examination as soon as he could don the neces-
sary sterile gloves. (R, 286, 287.) 
Dr. Harris' testimony, as it remained after cross-
examination, was in substantial accord with that of Dr. 
Peterson, the only other medical expert who testified. 
Neither witness could state when the umbilical cord 
prolapsed but pressure from the head of the fetus on 
the cord could have caused the death of the fetus even 
before the prolapsed cord protruded into the birth 
canal. (R. 277,310, 311.) 
5 
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Dr. Harris agreed that it was a proper exercise of 
judgment by Dr. Peterson to send the patient to the 
hospital for later induction of labor in view of his find-
ings in the office examination and that to send her at 
that time evidenced a proper concern for the safety of 
the patient. He further agreed that under the stand-
ard of practice, an obstetrician sending a patient to the 
hospital under such circumstances had the right to 
expect a call from the hospital, after the patient's ar-
rival, if there was any development or progress in the 
patient's condition. (R. 304, 305.) 
Since the effect of the medical testimony was that 
Dr. Peterson properly exercised his judgment in send-
ing the patient to the hospital for later induction of 
labor and since it was undisputed he had received no 
information indicating any adverse development in the 
patient's condition and since the umbilical cord was 
found to be prolapsed and lifeless upon his arrival and 
it was not then possible to avert the death of the fetus, 
there remained no basis for the jury to find that he 
had been negligent or that his conduct had proximately 
caused the damage of which plaintiff complained and 
thus the unanimous verdict of no cause of action against 
Dr. Peterson was fully supported by the record in this 
case. 
Prior to the reception of evidence, counsel for plain-
tiff submitted and argued a motion in limine in an at-
tempt to prevent the jury from learning the circum-
stances under which the pregnancy began, the fact of 
its illegitimacy and the fact that plaintiff was divorced 
and on welfare. (R, 200-206.) However, during cross-
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examination by counsel for the hospital, Dr. Peterson 
was asked to explain why his initial office record con-
cerning the plaintiff listed her name as Billie Jean 
Rex but later entries showed the name "Betty Nelson." 
Dr. Peterson replied that during the pregnancy, the 
plaintiff was required to give proper identification to 
the welfare department and as a result he then learned 
her name was Betty Nelson and that the pregnancy was 
illegitimate. (R. 268.) 
Plaintiff's attorney made an immediate motion for 
a mistrial which was extensively argued, during which 
it was pointed out to the Court that plaintiff, in her 
complaint against Dr. Peterson, claimed damages for 
mental distress and anguish, embarrassment and humil-
iation and that the fact of illegitimacy would be a rele-
vant and material factor in the jury's evaluation of 
whether the plaintiff had in fact sustained such dam-
age. The Court agreed and denied the motion for mis-
trial, stating that plaintiff "is here claiming great 
mental anguish because of the loss of the child. I think 
the fact that it was an illegitmate child might very well 
have a bearing upon that very thing" (R. 268-273.) 
Defendants' motions for a directed verdict after 
plaintiff rested (R. 372-390) and at the conclusion of 
all the evidence (R. 437-438) were taken under advise-
ment by the Court, (R. 437, 438.) The jury returned a 
unanimous verdict for both defendants. (R, 18, 456, 457.) 
Plaintiff's motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict and her alternative motion for a new trial were 
denied (R. 9, 10) and this appeal followed. (R. 5.) 
7 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE VERDICT IS CLEARLY SUPPORTED 
BY THE EVIDENCE AND SHOULD BE AF-
FIRMED. 
In a malpractice case of this kind, plaintiff has the 
burden of establishing, by expert medical testimony, not 
only the standard of care, but the claimed deviation 
from that standard. Dickinson v. Mason, 18 Utah 2d 
383, 432 P.2d 663 (1967); Marsh v. Pemberton, 10 Utah 
2d 40, 347 P.2d 1108 (1956); Anderson v. Nixon, 104 
Utah 262, 139 P.2d 216 (1943). Similar principles ap-
ply to the proximate causation of the injuries alleged. 
Expert testimony must be produced to show that the 
injuries were probably caused by the physician's devi-
ation from the standard of care. Without such evidence, 
there is nothing upon which a jury can base its finding 
on causation. Mere neglect or lack of skill is not enough. 
Huggins v. Hicken, 6 Utah 2d 223, 310 P.2d 523 (1957); 
Forrest v. Eason, 123 Utah 610, 261 P.2d 178 (1953); 
Anderson v. Nixon, supra. 
When these principles are applied to the facts of 
this case, it is apparent that the jury's verdict was com-
pelled by the plaintiff's failure to establish the basic 
elements of proof required in this kind of case. These 
principles have been uniformly applied by this Court 
in medical malpractice cases for more than 40 years 
but plaintiff's brief does not contain a single citation 
of authority, either from Utah or elsewhere, on the 
subject of medical malpractice and the proof required 
to establish it. 
8 
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To support her claim of negligence against Dr. 
Peterson, plaintiff relies solely upon testimony given 
by Dr. Harris (plaintiff's brief P. 5, 6) but examina-
tion reveals plaintiff's reliance is misplaced when Dr. 
Harris' testimony is considered in its entirety. It is 
fundamental that " testimony of a witness on his direct 
examination is no stronger than as modified or left by 
his further examination or by his cross-examination. 
A particular part of his testimony may not be singled 
out through the exclusion of other parts of equal im-
portance bearing on the subject." Alvarado v. Tucker, 
2 Utah 2d 16 268 P.2d 986 (1954). 
While Dr. Harris testified that a patient should be 
given an abdominal or vaginal examination upon ad-
mission to the hospital, he agreed on cross-examination 
that this would not be necessary if the patient had been 
examined by her physician immediately prior to com-
ing to the hospital and her amniotic membrane had not 
ruptured. (B. 308.) It was undisputed that Dr. Peter-
son had examined the patient just before admission and 
that the membrane was then intact. (R. 245.) 
Further, Dr. Harris testified on direct examina-
tion that a vaginal examination should be performed 
prior to machine induction of labor (R. 300) but he 
admitted upon cross-examination that this requirement 
was satisfied by the examination Dr. Peterson performed 
immediately after turning the stop cock to permit the 
drug from the machine to begin labor induction. (R. 311, 
312.) 
9 
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Finally, cross-examination of Dr. Harris revealed 
that Dr. Peterson had properly used his medical judg-
ment and his concern for the patient when he sent her 
to the hospital and under the applicable standard of 
practice prevailing in the community of obstetricians, 
Dr. Peterson had the right to expect a call from the 
hospital, after the patient's admission, if there was any 
development or progress in the patient's condition. It 
is undisputed that no such call was ever made to Dr. 
Peterson. (R. 258, 304, 305.) 
While it is thus apparent that the claim of negli-
gence evaporated under the cross-examination of plain-
tiff's expert there is even greater weakness in her claim 
of causation. Plaintiff apparently concedes this weak-
ness because the only portion of her brief relating to 
negligence and causation contains not one word of con-
tention that anything Dr. Peterson did, or failed to do, 
was the proximate cause of the death of the fetus. 
The only mention of proximate cause is found on 
page 6 of plaintiff's brief wherein this highly signifi-
cant statement may be found: 
Furthermore, it is also evident as a reasonable 
medical probability, that the cause of death of 
the fetus could have been avoided had the hos-
pital made its required examinations and followed 
procedures which were within the standard of 
care required by hospitals in the community. 
(Emphasis supplied) 
Plaintiff's brief does not mention, nor does the evi-
dence suggest, any action Dr. Peterson could have taken 
10 
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to avoid the death of the fetus and even the claim of 
causation as against the hospital was found to be with-
out solid foundation when Dr. Harris admitted that it 
was purely speculative whether the fetus would have 
survived even if the prolapsed umbilical cord had been 
promptly discovered. (R. 312, 313, 314, 315.) 
Plaintiff's failure to produce evidence of proximate 
causation as against Dr. Peterson is fatal to her claim 
against him. This Court succinctly stated the rule in 
Hug gins v. HicJcen, supra, as follows: 
As a general rule in a malpractice action, expert 
testimony must be produced to show that the in-
juries alleged were probably caused by the lack 
of due care of defendant. In the absence of such 
evidence, there is nothing upon which a jury can 
base its finding on the proximate cause of the 
injury. The evidence must be substantial and 
must, in cases of this complex type, have foun-
dation in expert medical testimony. 
The verdict in this case demonstrates the jury's 
conclusion that negligence, or causation or both had not 
been proved and under familiar principles of review, 
the verdict should be upheld by this Court. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN RECEIVING EVIDENCE 
OF ILLEGITIMACY AND IN ITS DENIAL 
OF A MISTRIAL. 
Plaintiff's motion in limine sought to prevent dis-
closure to the jury that plaintiff was on welfare, that 
this pregnancy was illegitimate and that it resulted from 
11 
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a one-night encounter with a man whose identity was not 
known to the plaintiff. In granting the motion, in part, 
the Court commented that an inquiry as to the identity 
of the father of the child "is not material or relevant 
here" and then the Court continued " I would suggest 
counsel that you not dwell upon that and not talk to 
the jury about the fact that the child was born out of 
wedlock." (R. 204.) 
In cross-examination by counsel for the defendant 
hospital, Dr. Peterson was asked the name plaintiff 
gave when she first came to him as a patient and since 
the record contained a later entry with a different name, 
he was asked when the second name was first given to 
him and in his response to that series of questions, he 
inadvertently disclosed the fact that plaintiff was on 
welfare and that the pregnancy was illegitimate. 
Plaintiff's counsel made an immediate motion for 
a mistrial and extensive argument followed. When it 
was pointed out to the Court that plaintiff's complaint 
sought damages for mental distress, mental anguish, 
embarrassment, humiliation and nervousness, it became 
apparent to the Court that the jury should be told the 
truth of the matter and if they were permitted to con-
sider the case upon the assumption that this was a 
normal and legitimate pregnancy, any verdict would be 
based upon a completely false premise. The Court fur-
ther agreed that the defendants would be prejudiced if 
the truth were withheld from the jury and since plain-
tiff was claiming mental anguish, the Court decided that 
12 
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the fact that the pregnancy was illegitimate " might very-
well have a bearing upon that very thing.'' The motion 
for mistrial was therefore denied. (R. 271, 272, 273.) 
Plaintiff has cited no authority in support of her 
claim that the reception of such evidence and the denial 
of the mistrial constituted an abuse of discretion which 
would justify reversal of this judgment. 
Rule 45, Rules of Evidence, bestows wide discre-
tion in the trial court in its rulings upon evidence and 
Utah case law makes it clear that in a review of a trial 
court's refusal to grant a mistrial, plaintiff has the 
burden of persuading this Court that the trial court 
was "plainly wrong." Burton v. Zions Cooperative Mer-
cantile Institution, 122 Utah 360, 249. P.2d 514 (1952). 
Plaintiff has presented no facts, no legal authority 
and no argument to satisfy that burden and since the 
trial court carefully weighed the conflicting contentions 
of the parties and concluded that no prejudice would 
result, plaintiff has failed to carry the burden of per-
suasion in this Court and the trial court should be af-
firmed in its rulings. 
POINT III 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN RULING 
THAT DAMAGES MAY NOT BE RECOV-
ERED FOR WRONGFUL DEATH OF AN 
UNBORN FETUS. 
Since the jury determined the issues of liability 
against the plaintiff and in favor of the defendants the 
Court's decision that damages are not recoverable for 
13 
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the death of the unborn fetus is moot and need not be 
considered on this appeal. Nevertheless, should the 
Court set the jury's verdict aside, the plaintiff's claim 
for wrongful death of the unborn fetus should not be 
allowed. 
In Webb v. Snow, 102 Utah 435,132 P.2d 114 (1942), 
the Court previously considered and rejected the right 
to recover for the wrongful death of an unborn child. 
In Webb, the plaintiff brought an action for assault and 
battery alleging that she suffered a miscarriage as a 
result of the injuries inflicted upon her. The Court 
stated: 
While injuries resulting in a miscarriage are ac-
tionable, and compensation may be awarded for 
the physical and mental sufferings experienced 
by a woman who has a miscarriage by reason of 
the injuries caused by the wrongful acts of others, 
,
 : damages are not awarded for "loss of the wt-
born child" itself. 132 P.2d at 119. (Emphasis 
supplied) 
The view adopted in Webb is wholly justified in 
light of legislative intent expressed in the wrongful 
death statutes and remains consistent with economic, 
as well as legal, realities. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-11-6 (1953) provides that a 
father, or in the case of his death or desertion of the 
family, the mother may maintain an action for the death 
of a "minor child." Since an action for wrongful death 
did not exist at common law, any right to such a claim 
must exist, if at all, only in accordance with the statutes 
under which recovery is sought. Webb v. Denver <& 
R.O.W. By. Co., 7 Utah 17, 24 P. 616 (1890). 
14 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In Norman v. Murphy, 124 C.A. 2d 95, 268 P.2d 
178 (1954), the California court considered a statute 
substantially indistinguishable from Utah's and held 
that the legislature did not intend to include unborn 
children in the definition of "minor persons" within the 
meaning of the California wrongful death statute. In 
the absence of an unequivocal mandate from the legis-
lature, the Court refused to indulge in legal fiction and 
speculation concerning the claimed loss. 
Similarly, the Utah legislature could easily have 
created a separate and distinct right to recover for the 
wrongful death of an unborn child, but it has not done 
so. Since the decision of this Court in Webb v. Snow, 
supra, it has been the law of this jurisdiction that no 
separate and distinct action exists for the wrongful 
death of an unborn child. The legislature, in more than 
40 years since the decision, has not chosen to alter the 
statute and its acquiescence should be viewed as sup-
port for the Court's present position. 
The refusal to create a right of recovery for the 
death of an unborn child is also consistent with eco-
nomic realities. This Court has consistently held that 
wrongful death actions are created to compensate sur-
vivors rather than to punish the tortfeasor. Conse-
quently, damages for wrongful death are allowed only 
for "the deprivation of some service, attention or care 
that has in it the element of pecuniary value." Burbidge 
v, Utah Light & Traction Co., 57 Utah 566, 196 P. 556 
(1921). In the case of prenatal death there is no com-
petent means of measuring any pecuniary value of the 
child to the parents. 
15 
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Ever since 1884, when our legislature adopted the 
statute permitting an action for the wrongful death of 
a minor child, this Court has repeatedly held that dam-
ages for such a death are to based upon a "pecuniary 
loss" and that damages for mental suffering and an-
guish resulting from the death are not recoverable. 
Counsel for plaintiff presumptively was aware of this 
statutory and decisional law and thus it is significant 
to note that in the complaint which began this action, 
there are no allegations suggesting any of the elements 
of damage which our Court has recognized as being part 
of a pecuniary loss. (E. 192.) Instead, the complaint 
alleges the plaintiff "suffered the death of a viable 
fetus, suffered great pain and mental distress, now 
suffers and will continue to suffer great mental an-
guish, embarrassment, humiliation, nervousness, nerv-
ous weakness, headaches and insomnia and will continue 
to be unable to normally perform her household duties.'' 
Thus it is apparent that when plaintiff began this 
action, she was not seeking the damages which are re-
coverable for wrongful death of a minor child and even 
in her statement of facts in her brief in this Court, 
plaintiff's claim of her damage is limited to the follow-
ing statement: 
As a result of the death of the fetus, plaintiff 
has suffered extreme and prolonged emotional 
distress. (Brief P. 3.) 
These elements of sorrow and anguish do not fur-
nish any basis for a damage recovery in a wrongful 
death action as has been held by this Court at least 
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since 1890 when the Court, in Webb v. Denver & R.G.W. 
Ry Co.y supra reversed a trial court which had per-
mitted a jury to consider mental suffering and sorrow 
as an element of damage in a wrongful death case. In 
its reversal, this Court said 
We think the mental suffering of the heir, on 
account of the death of a deceased relative, too 
remote and sentimental to be a proper element 
of damage under the statute . . . 
The speculative nature of damages inherent in an 
action for wrongful death of a fetus has been a prin-
cipal factor in the wise decision of many other courts 
throughout the country disallowing such a right of ac-
tion. In Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E. 2d 
425, 15 A.L.R. 3d 983 (1966), the Court stated: 
It is virtually impossible to predict whether an 
unborn child, but for its death, would have been 
capable of giving pecuniary benefit to anyone. 
None of the usual indicia such as mental and 
physical capabilities, personality traits, aptitudes 
and training of the wrongfully killed infant are 
present. While it is true that the social position 
of the parents may constitute a slight unit of 
measure, the probable future earnings of a still-
born foetus are patently a matter of sheer spec-
ulation. An objection, in the same vein, specific-
ally applicable to the wrongful death action is 
that it can hardly be seriously contended that 
the death of a foetus represents any real pecun-
iary loss to the parents. There may have been 
a time when the average child went to work as 
soon as he was able. That day has passed. Today, 
the rearing of a child typically constitutes a great 
pecuniary liability for the parents. 15 A.L.R. 3d 
at 988. 
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In short, the Court concluded that there can be no evi-
dence from which to infer pecuniary loss to the sur-
viving beneficiaries. The Court stated: 
Our Death Act was not intended to grant dam-
ages against a tortfeasor merely to punish him. 
We therefore hold that under our death act there 
can be no right of recovery for the wrongful 
death of an unborn child. Id. (Emphasis sup-
plied) 
The traditional rule recognized in this state and in 
numerous other jurisdictions throughout the country is, 
thus, entirely rational and supportive of sound judicial 
policy. The Court should not permit juries to award 
damages that are contrary to economic and social real-
ities and supported only by rank speculation. 
In summary, this Court should refuse to recognize 
a separate and distinct cause of action for the wrongful 
death of an unborn child. The legislature has not cre-
ated such an action and to do so judicially would give 
rise to unprecedented speculation in the computation of 
damage awards. Consequently, the Court should affirm 
the ruling of the trial court. 
i CONCLUSION 
The jury's verdict exonerating Dr. Peterson of lia-
bility for the loss of the plaintiff's child is clearly 
supported by and, indeed, compelled by the evidence on 
trial. 
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The plaintiff was afforded a full and fair oppor-
tunity to present her case to the jury and she has here 
shown no error was committed that could reasonably 
suggest a different result if the case were retried. 
Plaintiff has failed to overcome the presumption of 
validity of the judgment and this Court should affirm 
that judgment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WORSLEY, SNOW & 
CHRISTENSEN 
John H. Snow 
Attorney for Defendant and 
Respondent 
Perry A. Peterson, J\i.D. 
700 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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